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In this paper we propose a refinement of Michener’s (1978) well-known example classification based 
on data from university mathematicians. The refinement takes into account the mathematician’s 
perspective on the role of examples in doing mathematics. More specifically, our work provides 
insight into the ways in which mathematicians talk about using examples in their scholarly work and 
their work with students. The proposed classification has the potential to inform our work as 
teachers as we strive to create opportunities to engage students in authentic mathematical work. 
Keyword: Advanced Mathematical Thinking 
Examples play a significant role in teaching and learning mathematics. Often it is with a carefully 
formulated example that subtleties in a definition or an algorithmic process can be detected. 
Examples make it possible to consider generalities, but can also limit one’s mathematical 
perspective. Ideally, mathematical learning experiences provide opportunities to develop a rich array 
of examples that contribute to students’ problem-solving skills and understanding. 
Interestingly, what is known about the role of examples in doing mathematics is not adequately 
informed by the mathematician’s perspective. Few studies on examples or related topics have 
mathematician participants (c.f. Lockwood, Ellis, & Knuth, 2013). On the other hand, there is 
evidence that mathematicians frequently generate examples in the process of validating a proof given 
by a peer (Weber, 2008) and that mathematicians use different types of examples in conjecture-
related work (Lockwood, Ellis, & Knuth, 2013). In addition, given the number of proofs without 
words publications, it is reasonable to assume that mathematicians value opportunities to “see the 
general in the specific” (Mason & Pimm, 1984). That is, mathematicians sometimes use an example 
to make a proof. However, we have little evidence that speaks to the mathematicians’ perspective on 
the use of examples in teaching or how examples support their own mathematical work. 
Michener’s seminal work (1978) presented an epistemology of mathematics from her perspective 
as a mathematician that classified example types for the development of mathematical thinking: start-
up examples, reference examples, model examples, and counterexamples. Classifying an example is 
necessarily tied to the purpose the example serves in supporting mathematical learning. Studies on 
the use of examples with students continue to reference Michener’s classification (e.g., Alcock & 
Inglis, 2008; Watson & Mason, 2002; Zaslavsky & Shir, 2005). Because of this, we wondered 
whether Michener’s classification is useful when examining the ways mathematicians use examples 
in their work. In particular, we asked: do mathematicians’ articulations of the uses of examples align 
with these classes? Do the classes capture the range of the mathematicians’ articulations related to 
the uses of examples? 
We describe our initial refinement of Michener’s epistemology based on data from an earlier 
study where we examined how mathematicians make sense of definitions (Kinzel, Cavey, Walen, & 
Rohrig, 2011). We then use preliminary analysis of data from a current study focused on 
mathematicians’ use of examples more generally to propose further refinements.  
Background 
Michener’s (1978) epistemology of mathematical knowledge presents three interrelated 
categories of items: results (theorems), concepts (definitions, heuristics, advice), and examples 
(illustrative material). The interrelatedness of these categories is described in terms of a 
predecessor/successor relationship: Examples may lead to the construction of definitions and/or 
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theorems or alternatively may serve to illustrate a definition or theorem. These relationships are 
connected through the notion of “dual relations” and the identification of “dual items.” The dual 
items of a particular example are the ingredient concepts and results needed to construct the example 
and the results motivated by the example. Similar duals can be defined for results and concepts. 
Thus, examples are integrally entwined with the other categories of items. 
Michener further states that because not all examples are “created equal,” those more noteworthy 
deserve further attention and can be grouped into epistemological classes. These classes are not 
intended to be disjoint: A single example can play more than one role, perhaps even within a 
particular context or situation. It is these classes of examples in which we are interested. Michener’s 
four classes of examples are paraphrased below (1978, pp. 366–368). 
• Start-up examples are used to introduce a new subject by motivating basic concepts and 
useful intuitions, such as using a specific picture or visual representation to highlight key 
features of graphs of monotonically increasing sequences. 
• Reference examples are widely applicable and provide a common point of contact, and so 
tend to be referred to repeatedly. This class can also include standard cases used to verify 
one’s understanding of a particular concept or result as when a particular function is used to 
illustrate what it means for a graph to be concave down. 
• Model examples suggest and summarize the expectations and default assumptions about 
results and concepts. The absolute value function could be a model example for the idea that 
a continuous function need not be differentiable on its domain. 
• Counterexamples sharpen the distinctions between concepts and are used to show a statement 
is not true. The function f (x) = x3, x ∈ℜ  is a counterexample to the statement that all cubic 
polynomial functions have two local extreme values. 
Goldenberg and Mason (2008) elaborated on Michener’s classes, pointing specifically to the role 
of “pertinent nonexamples” (p. 184) in clarifying the sorting of items into things that are versus 
things that are not. Nonexamples are not equivalent to counterexamples in that there may not be a 
statement whose truth is in question; however, the identification of nonexamples can also serve to 
sharpen distinctions or interpretations of results and concepts. Nonexamples may also be used to 
develop one’s intuition (start-up example) or to verify one’s established understanding of a concept 
(reference). The primary use of nonexamples is to highlight contrast, which can overlap with the 
purposes of other classes. In this paper, we include nonexamples as a fifth class in our framework, 
paying particular attention to instances when nonexamples can be classified otherwise. As we 
describe in the next section, data from our earlier research supported the inclusion of this fifth class. 
Methodology  
Interview data from our earlier research, which focused on how mathematicians make sense of 
definitions, revealed themes related to the role of examples within that work (Kinzel, Cavey, Walen, 
& Rohrig, 2011). Nine mathematicians participated in interviews in which they were asked to first 
describe how they make sense of a new definition for themselves and then how they support students 
in making sense of new definitions. Examples, and the purposes for using examples, were prominent 
in the mathematicians’ descriptions. Making sense of definitions is a key component of mathematical 
work but does not capture the full range of that work. We used data from the earlier study to begin a 
refinement of Michener’s framework, then returned to the same group of mathematicians to explore 
the role of examples beyond the context of definitions. In the follow-up study we asked the 
mathematicians to review the classes of examples presented in the framework and consider (1) how 
well the framework reflects the ways in which they use examples, (2) if there are uses of examples 
not represented in the framework, and (3) if the framework is a useful means for thinking about 
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mathematical work, either for themselves or for students. As we are still collecting data from the 
follow-up study, what follows are the methods used to establish the initial refinement.  
Interview data were transcribed and pseudonyms were assigned to the participants. Individual 
research team members reviewed transcripts to identify instances where the mathematicians made a 
reference to the use of an example (example-instances); coded transcripts were then shared and 
example-instances verified. To be identified as an example-instance, an articulation by the 
mathematician either explicitly included the word “example” or referred to illustrating a concept or 
result in some way; for instance, a description of how the mathematician uses examples to clarify 
which items fit a definition and which do not counts as an example-instance. The instances we 
identified did not always include the articulation of a specific concept or mathematical object. Where 
possible, the specific concept or result within the instance was identified (e.g., articulating the 
usefulness of providing visual examples to illustrate the concept of collinear points).  
The second stage of analysis focused on coding the example-instances based on Michener’s 
(1978) classes of examples. We focused the data analysis through two questions: (a) What types of 
examples did the mathematicians describe? and (b) How did they describe the purpose of each 
example? We began this part of the analysis with a discussion of Michener’s classes and a group 
analysis of one transcript to clarify the shared understanding of the classes. This involved using 
transcript data to clarify distinctions between the classes. These distinctions often focused on the 
perspective of the learner as well as the intended use of the example by the mathematician. After 
these criteria were established, the remaining transcripts were analyzed by individual team members; 
two other team members then verified the coding. Within this analysis, we encountered several 
articulations related to the construction or analysis of things that are not; a function that would not 
meet the criteria of a particular definition, for instance. We introduced nonexamples as a fifth class in 
the framework to capture these articulations. 
To illustrate the coding process, we present several example-instances and the resulting 
classification. Consider the articulation from Adam in response to what helps him to make sense of a 
new definition: “I start off with things that are familiar to me . . . I would start going through the list 
of standard examples that I have in my head for these.” This instance was coded as reference because 
we inferred from this statement that Adam’s “standard examples” were widely applicable.  On the 
other hand, Sam responded to the same question as follows: “the simplest thing to try first is just to 
look at the specific concrete examples … you kind of get a feeling of how this specific definition is 
working.” This instance was coded as a start-up, since we inferred from “get a feeling of how this 
specific definition is working” that Sam’s purpose was to develop his intuition. About three-fourths 
of the way into the interview with Greg he began explaining the importance of using examples with 
students where the “main feature” of the concept is “worked out that we actually want to transport by 
those examples.” By this, we inferred that he was articulating the importance of using an example 
that illustrates critical features, and thus coded it as model.  
After we coded all the example-instances, we examined the instances within each class to 
identify themes in how mathematicians talked about using examples to support either their own or 
their students’ learning. Broad epistemological themes emerged within each class of examples. 
Recall that mathematicians were asked to reflect on their own processes/experiences as well as on 
those they intend for students. Because of this, it was necessary to identify the intended learner 
within example-instances. Each instance could potentially refer to the mathematician, to their 
students, or to a hypothetical learner. When we refer to the intended use of an example, we always 
mean in reference to the learner, whether it be the mathematician or a potentially hypothetical 
student. However, the epistemological themes that emerged address both the instructor’s and the 
learner’s perspective. It was the identification of these themes that led to the refinement of 
Michener’s classification of examples. 
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Initial Refinement of Michener’s Example Classification  
In this section we provide a description of our initial refinement of Michener’s example 
classification. Data analysis led to clarification on the classes already noted in the literature 
(Michener, 1978; Watson & Mason, 2005). Informal conversations with mathematicians about our 
proposed refinement indicate that these categories are useful but may not be exhaustive, especially in 
relation to work with results or theorems. For this reason, we anticipated data from the follow-up 
study to lead to further expansion and clarification of our initial refinement.  
See Table 1 for a list of the classes in our initial refinement and a summary of the purposes 
associated with each class. 
Table 1: Initial Refinement Of Michener’s Example Classification 
Class Purpose  
Start-up develop intuitive notions 
consider what is and what is not to isolate concept 
check initial understanding through generating examples 
Reference widely applicable or standard case 
isolate new subclasses of mathematical objects 
Model demonstrate salient features  
consider interplay between features of definition and example 
Counterexample refute the truth of a statement in question 
Nonexample demonstrate what is not 
show “control” of a definition  
consider particular features of a definition 
Start-Up Examples 
In presenting Michener’s classification, Watson and Mason (2005) describe start-up examples as 
those from which “basic problems, definitions, and results can be conjectured at the beginning of 
learning some theory and can be ‘lifted’ to the general case” (p. 64). The articulations from the 
mathematicians provide further detail into particular ways in which this conjecturing might be 
supported. For example, analyzing a collection of examples can help to isolate essential features of a 
new concept. The activity of generating examples of a new idea contributes to clarifying one’s 
emerging understanding of the idea. Creating variations of known examples can serve to further 
demonstrate or clarify one’s understanding. From the learner’s perspective, examples in this class 
should be familiar objects that also illustrate key features of the new concept. 
Mathematicians described using examples to develop intuition about the features of the concept 
that distinguish it from other related ideas. Greg articulated that students may not know to what to 
pay attention at first: “And then I might try to work out with them a little bit, you know, what could 
be mathematically interesting there? What are the features there?  . . . Then state a formal definition 
and then go and do plenty of examples to kind of work on that.” Ned articulated this use of examples 
in his own work: “But if it was foreign or I read it and realized that I didn’t truly understand it, then I 
probably would try to come up with an example. Which is a hard thing because you need your 
example easy enough to understand, yet hard enough so that it eliminates what needs to be 
eliminated.” Wes gave a similar response: “And how is it new? And can I think of something that 
does this as well as something that doesn’t do this?” Across these instances, the focus was on using 
examples of things that are as well as examples of things that are not to develop intuition for the 
essential features of a newly encountered definition.  
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Reference Examples 
Reference examples are intended to be widely applicable and available for consideration as a 
standard case. A learner may return to one or more reference examples while in the process of 
developing understanding of a new idea or subclass of mathematical objects; perhaps using a familiar 
example of a group to explore a new property, for instance. A learner may have a known and familiar 
set of standard examples that are consciously used to verify or extend understanding. As with model 
examples, the level of awareness of the learner with respect to the essential features of these 
examples is critical in their appropriate use. Overuse of a specific case could lead to confusion 
between aspects of the particular with aspects of the more general concept. 
Wes and Adam specifically discussed using familiar objects to understand an unfamiliar 
subclass of objects. Wes shared an experience of reading a student thesis in which a particular 
property was introduced. In considering whether he understood the property as it related to the thesis, 
he asked himself: “It says it does this, or these things do that, so why is this (stably free module) 
different from this thing that we have (free module).” To make sense of the notion, he noted that he 
began thinking of examples of free modules with which he was familiar and tried to identify which 
would have the new property and which would not. Adam expressed this same idea in his own work; 
a general practice for him when encountering a new idea is to check his “list of standard examples” 
to see which of those objects illustrate the new idea. Adam also explained how he uses this process 
with students. The instance he shared related to introducing the concept of algebraic groups; he drew 
students’ attention to familiar sets with operations (such as integers under addition) and then engaged 
them in determining which of these familiar things met the criteria of a group. In this way, Adam 
seemed to intend that these familiar instances could become reference examples for the students for 
the concept of group.  
Model Examples 
Model examples are intended as paradigmatic and generic, and can be used to convey salient 
features of an idea. As noted by Sam, a model example may emerge from the analysis of a collection 
of examples; one exemplar from the collection may serve as an illustration of the desired concept. 
The presentation of a model example can serve to highlight the interplay between the use of the 
example and one’s understanding of the idea; that is, the activity of determining why the presented 
exemplar qualifies as a model example potentially interacts with one’s understanding. Poor choice of 
a model example can cloud one’s understanding of an idea, in that this awareness of essential 
features may be (perhaps implicitly) compromised. 
In choosing examples to present to students as potential model examples, Greg emphasized the 
need for the example to illustrate the key features, and that it be “not too trivial,” yet also “not too 
complicated” as that could interfere with “seeing” the features of the concept. Marc also spoke of 
choosing pictures to convey relevant features to students. Ned stated that he uses the interplay 
between example and concept as a means for checking students’ understanding. After presenting a 
(model) example, he makes small variations, such as changing a positive slope to negative. In his 
experience, students who were able to see the key features were less likely to be distracted by the 
variation. That is, we would argue that Ned was determining whether students saw the initial 
presentation as a model example for the presented idea; if so, students were more likely to be able to 
identify key components and perhaps not be distracted by variations that did not alter the underlying 
concept. 
Nonexamples 
Nonexamples clarify distinctions between what is and what is not, and thus are used to 
demonstrate the importance of key features of a concept. The purpose of a nonexample can overlap 
the purpose of start-up, model, or reference examples. A collection of examples can be used to draw 
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attention to common features; contrasting such a collection with nonexamples serves to sharpen 
distinctions. The successful generation of relevant nonexamples can be taken as an indication of the 
“control” one has with regard to a concept or result. A learner’s explicit attention to aspects of 
nonexamples is an indication of depth of understanding. 
Mathematicians discussed using nonexamples to refine one’s understanding of a definition or 
concept. In particular, the generation of nonexamples can focus attention on salient features and the 
purpose of those features. Often, this involved dropping or violating one or more criteria within the 
definition and asking, in Ned’s words, “how does that change the outcome of what is permissible?” 
Sadie stated that nonexamples give a “different perspective” through analyzing what “it can’t be.” 
Sam acknowledged that “find[ing] an example in which this fails” can be challenging for students, 
but can be a critical step in developing understanding of the definition by forcing one to “look deeper 
at what things are.”  
Counterexamples 
Counterexamples are used to refute a statement. Some become well-known and used often. While 
not an explicit focus of our analysis, we see some common aspects. In particular, the learner’s 
awareness of why an instance qualifies as a counterexample for a given statement is key, and could 
serve as an indication of the learner’s understanding of the underlying ideas. 
Current Work 
We are currently in the midst of a follow-up study focused on mathematicians’ use of examples 
more broadly. We asked the mathematicians who participated in the definitions research study to 
read the results of that work, including our initial refinement of Michener’s example classification 
prior to a face-to-face interview. We also asked each mathematician to respond to the following 
questions in writing prior to the interview: 
• How well does the proposed example-use framework reflect the way you think about the 
purposes of different types of examples in your mathematical work? Please address this 
question as it relates to your scholarly work (writing, research, etc.) and teaching. 
• Is there is a type of example that you use that is not articulated in the framework? Is there an 
example type that you rarely use? Please explain. 
• Is the framework useful as a means of thinking about the different purposes of examples in 
doing mathematics? If so, in what ways?  
• Is the framework useful as a means of thinking about teaching mathematics? If so, in what 
ways?  
The mathematicians we have interviewed articulated benefits associated with thinking carefully 
about the purposes of different types of examples in their teaching but not in relation to their own 
mathematical work. They describe using examples for the purposes described in the initial 
refinement along with other purposes more closely related to their scholarly work. Thus far, it 
appears that there may be one or two other example classes that warrant defining. In particular, two 
mathematicians noted how examples can be preceded by definitions and results, providing the 
impetus for existence examples. The purpose of this class is to demonstrate the existence of a 
mathematical object and is thus distinct from the other classes. Greg noted, “You may actually 
indirectly prove that a thing exists without actually constructing it” while Evan noted odd perfect 
numbers as an instance where the definition has preceded examples. Another possible category is that 
of boundary examples—those that support understanding of “where the boundaries are” (Evan) with 
a concept or result. It not yet clear from the data whether this category stands on its own. The data 
suggest that there is overlap with the purposes of reference and nonexamples in that boundary 
Mathematical!Processes:!Research!Reports! !
 
Bartell,!T.!G.,!Bieda,!K.!N.,!Putnam,!R.!T.,!Bradfield,!K.,!&!Dominguez,!H.!(Eds.).!(2015).!Proceedings+of+the+37th+
annual+meeting+of+the+North+American+Chapter+of+the+International+Group+for+the+Psychology+of+Mathematics+
Education.!East!Lansing,!MI:!Michigan!State!University.!
322
examples can be used to identify subclasses of objects or to demonstrate control of a definition. 
Further analysis is needed to clarify these distinctions. Moreover, careful consideration of the 
epistemological value of potential new classes is needed. As noted by Michener (1978), the classes 
are not meant to be exhaustive but rather particularly informative in relation to thinking about how to 
fully support students in learning mathematics. 
Discussion 
Research indicates that students benefit from generating their own examples rather than passively 
accepting examples given by the teacher (Dahlberg & Housman, 1997; Watson & Mason, 2002; 
Sowder, 1980; Weber, Porter, & Housman, 2008). In our work, we observed mathematicians 
attending to perceived benefits of example generation both for themselves and for their students. 
Generating examples was seen to help build intuition about a new concept (start-up), to sharpen 
distinctions (non-example), and to reveal or verify understanding (start-up and/or model). In general, 
the ability to construct an appropriate example was taken as evidence of some level of understanding. 
Being able to then modify or create variations of the example could be further evidence of 
understanding. Constructing nonexamples was seen as more challenging, but was also seen as 
evidence of working knowledge of a concept.  
Watson and Mason (2005) describe example spaces as a metaphor for the psychological structure 
of the ideas and examples associated with a particular concept. An interesting feature within the 
mathematicians’ articulations was the interplay between examples and related ideas. For instance, 
Adam talked of drawing on his set of “standard cases” of objects to make sense of a new concept. He 
may think of standard examples of groups to make sense of a newly encountered type of group. 
Using Watson and Mason’s metaphor, he pulls reference examples from one example space to be 
used as start-up examples in a related space. In discussing their work with students, the 
mathematicians talked of beginning with objects that should be familiar or known to students, using 
these as start-up examples for a new concept, or establishing them as reference examples for a 
concept. These descriptions align with Watson and Mason’s characterization of mathematical activity 
as the reorganization of example spaces.  
Our work aligns with work by Lockwood and colleagues (2012, 2013) in which they analyzed 
mathematicians’ articulations of the role of examples within the context of exploring conjectures. We 
particularly agree with Lockwood, et al. (2012) as to the importance of “intentional example 
exploration” (p. 157). Our application of Michener’s classification relies on identifying the intended 
role of the example; for instance, a model example is most powerful when the learner recognizes the 
features that exemplify the concept. 
Implications 
In general, refinement of the example classification provides the mathematics education 
community with a common language about the role of examples in teaching and learning 
mathematics. Having a common language is important for future advances in the area. Of course, this 
work also raises important questions regarding the role of exemplification in the teaching and 
learning of mathematics. In particular, how well does the classification capture the role of examples 
within a broader context of mathematical activity? How might the classification be used to guide 
instructional design? Could deliberate attention to the purposes support the selection of, presentation 
of, and plans for student engagement with examples?  
A common language for example types can support more intentional selection of examples 
within instruction. From an instructional design perspective, one might attend to the intended purpose 
of an example to determine its place within the unit of study. Following Adam’s suggestion, for 
example, a textbook author might include one or more start-up examples of a concept prior to 
introducing a definition. Likewise, reference and model examples may be better placed after a 
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definition has been presented. Further, a classroom teacher might be more explicit about the role of 
examples, providing support to students’ interpretations and use of examples.  
References 
Alcock, L. & Inglis, M. (2008). Doctoral students’ use of examples in evaluating and proving conjectures. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 69, 111-129. 
Dahlberg, R. P., & Housman, D. L. (1997). Facilitating learning events through example generation. Educational 
Studies in Mathematics, 33, 283-299. 
Goldenberg, P. & Mason, J. (2008). Shedding light on and with example spaces. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 69, 183-194. 
Kinzel, M. T., Cavey, L. O., Walen, S. B., & Rohrig, K. L. (2011). How do mathematicians make sense of 
definitions? Proceedings of the Special Interest Group of the Mathematical Association of American on 
Research in Undergraduate Mathematics Education. Portland, OR. 
Lockwood, E., Ellis, A. E., Dogan, M. F., Williams, C. C. W., & Knuth, E. (2012). A framework for 
mathematicians’ example-related activity when exploring and proving mathematical conjectures. In L. R. Van 
Zoest, J. J. Lo, & J. L. Kratky (Eds.), Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of the North American Chapter of 
the Psychology of Mathematics Education (pp. 151-158). Kalamazoo, MI: Western Michigan University. 
Lockwood, E., Ellis, A., & Knuth, E. (2013). Mathematicians’ example-related activity when proving conjectures. 
In S. Brown, G. Karakok, K. H. Roh, & M. Oehrtman (Eds.), Proceedings for the 16th Annual Conference on 
Research in Undergraduate Mathematics Education, 1, 16-30. Denver, CO. 
Mason, J. & Pimm, D. (1984). Generic examples: Seeing the general in the particular. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 15, 277-289. 
Michener, E. (1978). Understanding mathematics. Cognitive Science, 2, 361–383. 
Sowder, L. (1980). Concept and principle learning. In R. J. Shumway (Ed.), Research in mathematics education (pp. 
244-285). Reston, VA: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics. 
Watson, A. & Mason, J. (2002). Student-generated examples in the learning of mathematics. Canadian Journal of 
Science, Mathematics, and Technology Education, 2(2), 115-133. 
Watson, A. & Mason, J. (2005). Mathematics as a Constructive Activity: Learners Generating Examples. Mahwah, 
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Weber, K., Porter, M., & Housman, D. (2008). Worked examples and concept example usage in understanding 
mathematical concepts and proofs. In M. P. Carlson & C. Rasmussen (Eds.), Making the connection: Research 
and teaching in undergraduate mathematics education, (pp. 245-252). Washington, D.C.: Mathematical 
Association of America. 
Weber, K. (2008). How mathematicians determine if an argument is a valid proof. Journal for Research in 
Mathematics Education, 39, 431-459. 
Zaslavsky, O. & Shir, K. (2005). Students’ conceptions of a mathematical definition. Journal for Research in 
Mathematics Education, 36, 317-346. 
